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If there is a governing style for every 
culture, in Israel that style is theft.
(Abdullah Schleifer, The Fall of 
Jerusalem, p. 47) 
While reading The Fall of Jerusalem over 
for this review, I realized how little work 
has been done by Palestinian historians 
on 1967, diplomatic and political treatises 
notwithstanding. This relative dearth of 
material is due to a number of obvious 
and some less obvious factors. 1948 is the 
marker of transformation in Palestine and the 
historic moment whose shadow hangs over 
everything, including scholarship, though 
the Nakba is an on-going colonial process 
of which the war in 1967 is a major aspect. 
For historians, working on the Nakba within 
the (narrow) lens of 1948 has been a duty 
of national importance. After all, the mere 
scope and size of Zionist mythology on the 
matter has taken decades to counter. If the 
victor tells the tale, Palestinians have been 
trying desperately for three generations, and 
at the very least, to proclaim: we did and do 
exist here. Within this colonial context it is 
even more troubling to reflect on Jerusalem 
in 1967 and think about how the important 
work of “recording” has taken a back seat 
relative to our other individual and collective 
concerns. 
First published in 1972, Abdullah 
Schleifer’s The Fall of Jerusalem can be 
considered a text of primary importance in 
Palestine studies in general, and studies on 
Jerusalem in particular. It is both a primary 
source, as Schleifer, then a journalist for the 
English-language Jerusalem Star/Palestine 
News and now a Professor Emeritus of 
Journalism at the American University in 
Cairo, was an eyewitness to the war in 1967 
and recorded the details of the events and 
their aftermath. It is also a useful secondary 
source, as Schleifer put the war in its local, 
regional and international historical and 
political context. A journalist with a keen 
political eye, Schleifer wrote a hugely 
useful and informative book that is now 
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largely forgotten. A resident of a city under siege, Schleifer also wrote the narrative of 
Jerusalem as the Arab residents lived it and the few soldiers and many civilians tried 
to defend it. 
Recently, I sat with a friend who lived the turmoil of the war in the village of Bayt 
Sourik located near the infamous “Radar” in the north-western section of greater 
Jerusalem Schleifer mentions as part of the “fall of the city.”1 Perhaps because my 
friend was a very willing and vivacious story-teller, and perhaps because she and her 
family found their way back to their home and land, her story was both tragic and 
exciting. It was full of blame: for the Jordanian army that she did not see let alone 
hear, for the Israeli army that – in their great numbers – knew exactly where to go 
and how to get there, and for the Palestinians, who so soon after the first catastrophe 
in1948 seemed as scattered and unprepared to deal with unrelenting Zionist aggression 
as they had been two decades earlier. 
Her words resonate with Schleifer’s account of the days of the war. Though her 
narrative sounded a bit like an adventure novel, most of the stories I have gathered 
from those who lived through the urban confusion of Jerusalem in June of 1967 read 
more like desperate tales of resilience in the face of defeat. In fact, I find that many 
Jerusalemites hesitate to recall those days and do so in great agony. These stories (and 
silences) put Schleifer’s narrative in fundamentally important literary and historic 
perspective. 
Though reporting on contemporary events, Schleifer was also very much embedded 
in the rich medieval history of Jerusalem. Throughout the narrative he constantly 
reverts back to the Crusader wars on the city, relating them to Zionist aggression. 
In this context, discussions of modernity were not as important to the author as 
understanding the mentality of aggression and conquest as well as placing the Zionist 
presence in the city in historical perspective. Although reference to the Crusades is 
not uncommon in the Arab world, it is important to note here that his tone in doing so 
was to achieve a sort of historic balance and to reinforce the alien nature of Zionist 
colonialism in Arab lands. In spite of the undeniable military success of the Zionist 
army, Schleifer seemed to be suggesting the temporary nature of this aggression on the 
Arab city. 
Historians have the advantage of thinking in the long-term, thereby lightening the 
burden of total defeat that the author clearly felt in the days of the wars and the years 
that succeeded it. In his words, “the fall of Jerusalem on June 7, 1967 – 859 years to 
the day since the Crusader armies first appear before the walls of the Holy City – and 
the occupation that has followed are a microcosm of the fate of all Palestine and the 
entire Arab-Israeli conflict.” (p. 7) Moreover, like others witnessing the tragedy of 
colonial oppression in Palestine, the author was perplexed with how world opinion had 
somehow not labeled this conflict as such: “here is a clinic for case studies in a still 
dynamic settler-colonialism of the most subtle sort, successful to the degree that it has 
evaded the colonialist label (at least in the West) throughout an anti-colonialist epoch. 
Only in Palestine is it still possible for liberals to cheer cowboys gunning down the 
Indians or pushing them back into the badlands.” (p. 9) 
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Schleifer’s descriptions of living the aftermath of the war preceded details of 
the war itself for reasons that become clear by the end of the book. Israel, under its 
propaganda of “unification” took immediate steps to erase the Arab presence in the 
city. Recording this attempted erasure that he constantly refers to as “deArabization,” 
Schleifer writes, “there is a difference between the vibrations of a lived city and a cold 
piece of restoration; between a community that shares and cultivates the values of a 
way of life which takes concrete form in the shapes of a particular urban style and 
the distant appreciation of visitors to a museum.” (p. 14) An obvious continuation of 
Zionist aggression, the conquest of Jerusalem was a story that could have easily been 
foretold decades earlier, but this keen observer noticed what may have passed others 
by: “the city remains solemn because the Arabs have remained. Because neighborhood 
life is somehow simultaneously a teeming noisy marketplace and a self-conscious 
stage governed by an ancient sense of the rituals of politeness and discretion. Because 
the bombs and dynamite charges of Arab guerrillas shattered suave visions to reassert 
the more naked truth that this city, though conquered, is Arab.” (pp. 14-15) 
Almost poetic at times, Schleifer writes of his belonging to the city: “it was with an 
eye to the past, the visible Arab past, that I first came to this city and struggled to stay 
on for the peace of Jerusalem … there is a psychological weight to these old wrinkled 
stones I love and the massive, intertwined homes they form; to the buttresses that 
bridge the cobbled lanes turning streets into tunnels as the houses of Jerusalem rise in 
the air. A seductive psychology, fed also by the security of familiar neighborhood life.” 
(pp. 16-17) He further reveals his placement within this dynamic: “we were Muslims, 
obviously ‘pro-Arab’ foreigners allowed to remain in an occupied territory only by 
the tolerance of the occupiers.” (p. 17). A journalist, an intellectual and an American 
Jewish convert to Islam, Schleifer was actually mandated by his position to write as an 
observer, but within the pages of this book, it becomes obvious that the imaginary (and 
false) line between observer/witness and participant was necessarily traversed. Finally 
in this intricate introduction, he sets forth the over-all mandate of his work: “we are all 
bound together … by the fall of Jerusalem, and beyond such personal qualifications 
the data are fixed and it is well that someone speak.” (p. 18) 
Beyond this personal and political introduction, Schleifer also offers a concise 
reading of Zionist settler-colonialist history of conquest that led to the tragedy of 1948, 
and a reading of the local, regional and global political quagmire between 1948 and 
1967. Though not a particularly surprising reading of what now might seem obvious, 
presenting this information in this context in 1972 and as an explanation for an 
English-reading audience of the war in 1967 must be noted for both its bold style and 
as an important scholarly intervention for its time. His political agenda, never far from 
the pages of the book, is also significant, for although this brief history is one of defeat 
and conquest, the larger picture remained clear for the author: “there is an inescapable 
twist to this history, which will keep repeating itself until the name of Palestine 
returns to everyone’s map.” (p. 38) Moreover, though his present time was mainly 
about defeat, Schleifer paid constant attention to the on-going presence of Palestinian 
resistance: “by refusing to disappear, it is the Palestinian who has most thoroughly 
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frustrated Zionist ambitions despite the periodic flashy Israeli military triumphs.” (p. 
56) To historicize this assertion, Schleifer explains the politics of the 1950s and 1960s 
through the lens of resistance. 
Offering an adequate reading of Arab politics at the time, from the “progressive” 
politics of Gamal Abdel Nasser and the Ba‘thists to the conservative policies of the 
kingdoms from Jordan to the Gulf, Schleifer placed all of these political maneuvers 
within the context of growing Palestinian revolutionary parties and politics. Of 
particular importance is his critique of the resistance movements. Although he 
presents them as the best hope for Arab Palestine he also asserts that their actions and 
programs demonstrate a lack of the basic knowledge of what he continually refers to 
as “revolutionary theory.” He never, however, fully explores what revolutionary theory 
means or shows how its use would make the resistance more effective. Nevertheless, 
what he describes as “fedayeen activity” is an important reminder for an audience 
in the post-Oslo era of the basic theoretical foundations of the Palestinian parties, 
movement, and leadership. An “indigenous revolt,” in this sense, can be read within 
the anti-colonial perspective that once existed, far from the complicity of all of these 
players that embody an “Oslo Palestine.” 
After establishing the political backdrop to 1967, Schleifer then details the prelude 
to war. In his description of two significant events, the reader is taken back not only 
to the politics of pre-war 1967, but also to the emotional drama that preceded the 
war. This is quite significant as it takes the reader into a world that seems nearly as 
distant as Schleifer’s descriptions of the eventual defeat of the Crusaders at the hands 
of Arab armies. This distance has been created by years of political malaise and a 
Palestinian national movement that has replaced anti-colonial resistance with pointless 
and complicit diplomacy. Schleifer reminds the reader of Mahmoud Bakr Hijazi, 
a freedom fighter who infiltrated the colonial borders from Jordan on a resistance 
mission and was subsequently caught and imprisoned by the Israeli army. According 
to Schleifer, Hijazi’s trial was a sign of things to come as it was “an indication of 
the seriousness of the Fatah challenge to the Israeli military establishment only five 
months after the launching of their first raids.” (p. 80). Put within the context of fear 
of Palestinian resistance along with the clear Zionist plans for the conquest of all of 
historic Palestine (as well as their economic crisis), Israel’s need for war in retrospect 
seems quite obvious. Moreover, rather than dwelling on the causes and effects of 
defeat (though certainly that is a part of the narrative), Schleifer’s reading is one that 
takes Palestinian resistance as a fundamental factor in juxtaposition with the paralysis 
of the surrounding Arab states to adopt or even support any kind of resistance to 
Zionist occupation and aggression. 
In a chapter aptly titled “The Trap” Schleifer carefully details the beating of the 
drums of war. In line with the rest of his argument, he counters Zionist and American 
myths regarding the causes of the conflict. Describing the Israeli war machine, 
and Arab (in particular Egyptian) miscalculations, Schleifer negates the Zionist 
narrative of David and Goliath in 1967. As he recounts the diplomatic maneuvers 
and manipulations in the months and weeks leading up to the war, it seems almost 
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painfully obvious that Zionist intentions towards war and the complete occupation of 
Palestine were the overall battle plan and it was just a matter of time and opportunity 
for them to implement it. Though, like other aspects of Zionist mythology, the lies 
about the war have perhaps had more resonance, this chapter tells the tale as it 
happened and as he witnessed it. 
Imperial connections and comparisons to previous wars dominate this section of 
the narrative, for 1967 ushered in a new era of imperial patronage as the United States 
took the baton from the British and became the real site of pre-war planning and 
post-war carte blanche support for Israeli colonial expansion. In the context of Israeli 
military belligerence prior to the start of the war, Schleifer remarks that “the Israeli 
threats and troop movements in this period are of particular importance, not only in the 
obvious sense of understanding the immediate historical development of the crisis, but 
in the way they were comprehended by conventional American public opinion.” He 
further elaborates on Americans forgetting the Israeli active military push towards war 
in April and May: “by the first week of June, these events of late April and early May 
no longer existed in conventional American comprehension, which only ‘understood’ 
that Abdul Nasser had closed the Straits of Tiran in a calculated gesture to ‘strangle’ 
Israel while the Arab wolf pack closed in for the kill. The rest was strictly Miracle.” 
(pp. 101-102). For this alone, this book can be considered a valuable contribution that 
benefits both contemporary scholars and general readers. 
Though politics and diplomacy have dominated historical narratives of the war, 
people’s experience, particularly that of Jerusalem’s residents, is perhaps the most 
valuable part of Schleifer’s account. Through his contemporary observations, the 
author manages to combine the bitterness of defeat with the hope of renewal via 
resistance. Within defeat, the Palestinian population confronted a new era of their 
history. The author’s descriptions of the city as it was invaded and as the residents in 
the city held the strongest line of defense are as captivating as they are enlightening. 
Jerusalem’s extended neighborhoods and the Old City, as a contained entity, were 
the sites of the fiercest battles in the short days of the war. Local residents wanted 
weapons – that the Jordanian army promised – and eventually it was the people of 
Jerusalem, most of whom did not receive these promised arms, who stood as the last 
and strongest line of defense against the conquerors. These are the stories that have 
been largely ignored in the historiography of Jerusalem. Because of the incredible 
importance of the experiences of the people of Jerusalem in the war, the reader 
is left wanting much more. Schliefer affords some space for these stories, but not 
nearly enough for the reader to fully understand both the devastation of defeat and 
extraordinary resilience of the people. Because of this, the story of Jerusalem in 1967 
is yet to be written. 
As Schleifer describes it, the complicity of Arab states (in particular Jordan) can 
be read as the backdrop for the resistance that began almost immediately in 1967 and 
defined the subsequent era. The story of this war was also the story of what the post-
war atmosphere brought about regarding a “peace process.” As in the other sections of 
the book, Schleifer breaks down the situation both from the perspective of Israel and 
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that of the surrounding Arab states. Not holding back punches, he writes of the Arab 
political elites’ inability to read Israeli and American intentions and their subsequent 
inability to react. He reinforces this argument by reading defeat as that of official 
Arab politics and promise as that of the power of the Palestinian people and of guerilla 
warfare (or what he calls the work of the “fedayeen”) by Palestinian parties and 
movements, in so doing he returns the narrative of Palestine to Palestinians. 
Rana Barakat is an Assistant Professor in the Department of History at Birzeit 
University.
Endnotes
1 Radar is a hill fifteen kilometers west of 
Jerusalem where the British military installed 
anti-air radar. It was turned over to the 
Jordanian army in 1948, occupied by Israel in 
the 1967 War and now is the site of an Israeli 
settlement named Har Adar.
